From Lab Bench to Innovation: Critical Challenges to Nascent Academic Entrepreneurs

University research laboratories are important sources of the inventions and discoveries that become significant innovations with broad economic and societal impact. Invention alone is not innovation; innovation is the long, hard work of taking new technologies and bringing them to commercialization.There are many pathways for the dissemination of new knowledge that arises from basic research at universities, ranging from traditional methods such as publication and training students to licensing technology to established firms or new ventures.One way to transform new knowledge into valuable innovations is for university researchers to undertake the creation of new firms based on their discoveries through academic entrepreneurship. The problem is that university scientists and inventors with a discovery made at a laboratory bench face challenges beyond those experienced by traditional high-technology venture founders: they must finish creating the technology before they can begin using it.Academics typically start with inventions so immature that their commercial success cannot be predicted Academic entrepreneurship is an emerging and developing phenomenon, and there is a growing body of literature about new ventures based on university academic. However, limited research has been directed toward nascent academic entrepreneurs (NAEs) to understand the key challenges of bringing innovations to market. The majority of this work has focused on the institutional experience rather than the academic entrepreneurs and their individual experiences . Within the broader fields of entrepreneurship and innovation, it has been argued that high-potential startups such as academic ventures should receive particular attention from scholarsThe following research addressed this gap.Nascent academic entrepreneurship involves more than transforming an invention into a commercialized innovation. It is about the genesis of ideas and the emergence of opportunities, the birth of new organizations, their evolution into new companies, and the transformation of scientists into leaders. It also is about providing the foundation for future innovation by others. Though nascent academic entrepreneurship is increasing in frequency, it is not well understood. The dissertation examines this important topic

Algebraic and hamiltonian approaches to isostokes deformations

We study a generalization of the isomonodromic deformation to the case of connections with irregular singularities. We call this generalization Isostokes Deformation. A new deformation parameter arises: one can deform the formal normal forms of connections at irregular points. We study this part of the deformation, giving an algebraic description. Then we show how to use loop groups and hypercohomology to write explicit hamiltonians. We work on an arbitrary complete algebraic curve, the structure group is an arbitrary semisimiple group.Comment: 23 pages, minor corrections in the introduction, references expande

Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two- Stage Political Contests

This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the first stage, parties run their primaries and in the second stage the winners of the primaries compete in the general election. The resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning candidates are partially or fully carried over to the second stage. Experimental results support all major theoretical predictions: the first stage expenditures and the total expenditures increase, while the second stage expenditures decrease in the carryover rate. Consistent with the theory, the total expenditures increase in the number of candidates and the number of parties. Contrary to the theory, however, expenditures in both stages of the competition exceed theoretical predictions. Disclosing information about the opponent’s expenditures in the first stage increases the second stage expenditures and decreases the first stage expenditures.political contest, experiments, information uncertainty, over-expenditures

Using Technology to Develop Ethical Choice in Engineering Students

This paper describes the interactive technology that we have added to an undergraduate course titled “Engineering Ethics and Impact on Society.” The purpose of this technology is to develop students’ awareness of cultural differences in engineers’ approaches to ethical practice, and to develop students’ abilities to communicate in a global workplace. These goals are being pursued through a website that is publicly available, titled Reflective Choices http://ReflectiveChoices.ttu.edu. We describe the development of the website and results from the first several months of implementation. A major purpose of this paper is to make our colleagues aware of this website and to encourage them to contribute featured articles related to engineering ethics and professional practice.Cockrell School of Engineerin

Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests

This article experimentally studies a two-stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one-stage contest. Contrary to the theory, the two-stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one-stage contest. There is significant over-dissipation in both stages of the two-stage contest and experience diminishes over-dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage. Our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject’s utility. A simple behavioral model that accounts for a non-monetary utility of winning can explain significant over-dissipation in both contests. It can also explain why the two-stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one-stage contest.rent-seeking, contest, contest design, experiments, risk aversion, over-dissipation

Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation

This paper experimentally compares the performance of four simultaneous lottery contests: a grand contest, two multiple prize settings (equal and unequal prizes), and a contest which consists of two subcontests. Consistent with the theory, the grand contest generates the highest effort levels among all simultaneous contests. In multi-prize settings, equal prizes produce lower efforts than unequal prizes. The results also support the argument that joint contests generate higher efforts than an equivalent number of subcontests. Contrary to the theory, there is significant over-dissipation. This over-dissipation can be partially explained by strong endowment size effects. Subjects who receive higher endowments tend to over-dissipate, while such over-dissipation disappears when the endowments are lower. This behavior is consistent with the predictions of a quantal response equilibrium. We also find that less risk-averse subjects over-dissipate more.rent-seeking, contest, contest design, experiments, risk aversion, over-dissipation

The Effects of Monetary Policy in the Czech Republic: An Empirical Study

within VAR, structural VAR, and the Factor-Augmented VAR framework. We document a well-functioning transmission mechanism similar to the euro area countries, especially in terms of persistence of monetary policy shocks. Subject to various sensitivity tests, we find that contractionary monetary policy shock has a negative effect on the degree of economic activity and price level, both with a peak response after one year or so. Regarding the prices at the sectoral level, tradables adjust faster than non-tradables, which is in line with microeconomic evidence on price stickiness. There is no price puzzle, as our data come from single monetary policy regime. There is a rationale in using the real-time output gap instead of current GDP growth as using the former results in much more precise estimates. The results indicate a rather persistent appreciation of domestic currency after monetary tightening with a gradual depreciation afterwards.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64350/1/wp922.pd

A lender-based theory of collateral

We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects, so that she inefficiently rejects marginally profitable projects. Collateral mitigates the inefficiency by increasing the local lender’s payoff from precisely those marginal projects that she inefficiently rejects. The model predicts that, controlling for observable borrower risk, collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The model also predicts that borrowers for whom local lenders have a relatively smaller information advantage face higher collateral requirements, and that technological innovations that narrow the information advantage of local lenders, such as small business credit scoring, lead to a greater use of collateral in lending relationships. JEL classification: D82; G21 Keywords: Collateral; Soft infomation; Loan market competition; Relationship lendin